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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Charity remains a leading brand in society, continuing to command public goodwill 
and response.  It is underpinned by a long tradition and law – both raising questions 
for the wider public as well as ‘specialists’, about ‘modernisation’ and coherence. 
 
1.2 Civil society is newer in ordinary usage, still more comfortably used by ‘practitioners’ 
(and especially in international English), but increasingly used as a catch all for 
voluntary action, citizen participation and other features promoted as tests of the 
health of society. 
 
1.3 ‘Civil Society’ has a long tradition in academic study (though part of the ‘modern’ 
world compared to the charity tradition) but it has no legal definition (though there are 
moves to create it, especially in the civil law jurisdictions, to overcome the division of 
foundation/association).  It is promoted by apologists for the ‘free world’ as the free 
association of citizens serving their ends unconstrained by the State and therefore a 
necessary element in a free society.  Charity by contrast is determined by an 
ultimately legal judgment of the public good and is the natural partner of government. 
I once wrote that ‘charity is the realisation of the rhetoric of civil society’.  Yet the 
contrast of civil society as a necessarily separate ‘third’ sector, set over against the 
‘public’ sector controlled by the State, and charity cooperating with government, 
whether Crown and charitable trusts in 1601 or public authorities and charities under 
21st century compacts, raises questions about the simple identification of civil society 
and charity.  The aim of this paper is to examine these questions. 
 
2. CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
2.1 There is no generally accepted definition of civil society.  (Barry Knight has 
commented that the concept has passed from obscurity to platitude without passing 
through the intervening stage of meaningfulness!)  Civil society organisations tend to 
be defined by negatives – nongovernmental, not for profit – NGOs/NPOs, neither 
State nor market.  These characteristics are taken to suggest virtue – not corrupted 
by power nor greed – therefore having an integrity which makes civil society 
organisations a necessary check against the abuse of power and market force. 
 
2.2 There are questions of how civil society organisations are held to account for meeting 
the standards of integrity presumed to be a feature of this sphere.  Alongside issues 
of the legal underpinning of civil society there are questions of the proper regulation of 
it – how to square the circle that civil society is necessary independent with the fact of 
human fallibility and abuse to which civil society is inevitably exposed.  This is a vital 
issue, but this paper cannot go into it.  I shall confine my consideration to the question 
of what the virtues of civil society organisations actually are, what their distinctive and 
distinctively valuable ethos consists of (and which accountability and regulation would 
uphold). 
 
2.3 One appealing definition of civil society – what Gellner called the ‘simplest, immediate 
and intuitively obvious’ definition is ‘that set of diverse non-governmental institutions 
which is strong enough to counterbalance the State’. This starts from the premise of 
freedom of association – another tenet of the ‘modern’ world – under which citizens 
have the right to join together to pursue their own ends (within the law – a necessary 
qualification, which muddies the purity of freedom of association and is relevant to the 
qualification to which I am leading).  There is a positive and a negative attribute in 
this.  The negative is that without that right people are exposed to abuse of state 
power – this underpins the faith put in civil society as the ‘counterbalance’ (to use 
Gellner’s word) or even the guarantor of liberty from State corruption and oppression. 
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The whole CIVICUS agenda and the Commonwealth Foundation civil society and 
governance programme reflect this aspect.  The positive is that citizens are better 
judges of their interests and needs than the emanations of the State – a perspective 
much favoured by 21st century politicians presiding over the (public expenditure 
influenced) contraction of the State.  (It is a perspective in danger of being 
exaggerated since individuals, even in association, may not be the best judge of their 
interest and are certainly not guaranteed to be the best judges of the general interest, 
when differing interests collide). 
 
2.4 The concept of public benefit plays a radically different role in this civil society 
perspective to its centrality in charity.  While it is central to the ideology of civil society 
it enters indirectly and by assumption.  That is, the public benefit of civil society 
organisations arises from the premise that what citizens seek in their interests 
indirectly secures the general interest – a ‘social benefit’ hidden hand parallel to the 
hidden hand which secures general economic benefit through the market pursuit of 
private benefit.  An attractive complement to a Hegel, Chicago, Thatcherite economic 
ideology, but surely too Panglossian for the 21st century! 
 
2.5 And surely the reality of civil society confirms this.  Many civil society organisations, 
whether they have been subjected to the rigorous (or arcane, depending on your 
point of view!)  tests of public benefit prescribed by charity law, or not, manifestly (i.e. 
to all but the most peculiar point of view) serve the public good.  Where one draws the 
line, where public benefit is not outweighed by private benefit – so critical and 
therefore distorting a determination in charity it is not an issue for civil society.  At its 
extremes as represented by the guru of civil society, Robert Putnam, the mere fact of 
association – whether for choral singing, playing sports or watching birds – is 
beneficial.  Maybe trivial pursuits (if one is reckless enough to describe another 
person’s pleasure so!) are good for society – perhaps the modern opium of the 
people.  But (to be reckless!) associations for tiddlywinks are surely blameless rather 
than publicly beneficial.  (The logic of this is of course that I must admit the same of 
the chess clubs I play at!)   Certainly such associations are not publicly beneficial in 
the way that, for example, giving succour to refugees is.  But what about citizens 
coming together to act against refugees or minority communities?  To make an easy 
point, the Ku Klux Klan undoubtedly passes the tests for civil society organisations of 
being non-governmental and non-profit.  More challengingly, many associations 
serving the interests of their members are, through that very fact, opposed to the 
interests of others. A community campaigning to prevent the destruction of their town 
and country by road or rail construction seeks to put its interests above those who 
benefit from easier travel.  Less controversially, clubs which restrict membership to 
particular groups or exclude particular groups, whether on class or ethnic grounds, 
may be against the general public interest rather than promoting harmony. 
 
2.6 That there is a “dark side” to civil society that is increasingly recognised.  One may 
say that civil society spans a spectrum from bodies which serve the public good 
(‘positive’ civil society), through those which pursue essentially private interests 
(‘neutral’ civil society) to those which are against the public good (‘negative’ civil 
society).  These are not legally demarcated.  Whether these demarcations should be 
underpinned by law, with all the technicalities and borderline decisions that entails, 
would become an issue if civil society law is developed.  Certainly there is interest in 
developing a legal basis for ‘public benefit organisations’ (PBOs) as a civil society law 
concept.  Important questions about the trade off between privileges, such as fiscal 
relief and responsibilities, reflected in accountability and regulation then arise.  They 
are beyond the scope of this paper; but they do link with the place of charity in the 
ancient common law form of public benefit organisation. 
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3. CHARITY 
 
3.1 What is charity? is a question which can be asked at many levels (and is difficult to 
answer at any level).  A non lawyer may be forgiven for feeling that the difficulty in 
answering the question at the legal level undermines its claim to being a satisfactory 
basis for so important a part of social organisation, is an affront to common law claims 
to being fit for the modern world – or perhaps just a job preservation scheme for 
charity lawyers!  Certainly the technicalities (or obscurities) of charity status 
determination on the borderline are a general issue of concern to those anxious to 
establish charities.  The temptation to treat the four-headed Pemsel clarification as a 
definition is irresistible – we did not, for example, manage to resist it in the Scottish 
Commission’s report.  But it is of course clear that the open endedness of the fourth 
head of ‘other purposes beneficial to the community’ at once undermines Pemsel’s 
claim to be a definition and provides the mechanism for the constant renewal of 
charity which is the great virtue claimed for the common law approach.  And it 
highlights two fundamental characteristics of charity, that it is for the public benefit.  
How that is determined, the significance of the presumption that the first three heads 
of poverty, education and religion are for the public good, and the implications of 
removing that presumption as recommended by the NCVO working group in England 
and, implicitly by the Scottish Commission, are important issues beyond the scope of 
this paper.  The fact that determining whether the purpose of an organisation meets a 
public benefit test is at the heart of charity, is a fundamental difference between the 
concept of charity and civil society.  How important is that difference? 
 
3.2 It is often emphasised that charity is determined by purpose not form (unlike civil law 
codes, where foundation/association form is fundamental).  This is true, but only part 
of the truth.  ‘Ethos’ reflected in the requirements of independent governance by 
trustees and the use of all resources to the purpose of the charity are as fundamental, 
and equate to the non-governmental, non profit characteristics of civil society.  Thus 
far the view that charity is that part of civil society which is positively directed at public 
benefit purposes seems to hold. 
 
3.3 There is however a fourth candidate for one of the fundamental determinants of 
charity, namely that they may not be political.  That civil society organisations are not 
part of the political process is a generally accepted, if not entirely logical, part of the 
definition of civil society. (Political parties are regarded as part of the State, though 
where the line between political parties and politically active civil society organisations 
lies is not determined, need not be determined, except where political parties have a 
status which is constitutionally distinguishing).  But charity law goes much further, in 
excluding bodies whose purposes are to change the law or government policy – 
precisely the roles at the heart of the counterbalance to the State in Gellner’s 
definition.  And this, in English law, is one of the firmer and more recently (well, 
relatively recently by charity law standards!) reaffirmed, in the Amnesty case of 1982.  
The fact that it appears to rest on particular (peculiar?) features of the legal concept 
and status of charities as legal entities (‘trusts subject to enforcement by the courts’) – 
a feature which might be reformed – not without difficulty, but at least without 
disturbing the other fundamental characteristics of charity – does not alter the fact 
that it is, in the common law tradition, a fundamental characteristic of charity.  
Furthermore, I argue, it is a characteristic which relates to a characteristic of the 
charity tradition and its origins which casts doubt on the easy identification of charity 
and civil society. 
 
3.4 Charity has origins going back far beyond 1601.  There is much competition for the 
honour of being the oldest extant charity – I spoke at the 700th anniversary 
celebrations of the Sheffield Town Trust when I was at the Charity Commission and 
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there are almshouses going back 1000 years.  Even the 1601 preamble is prefigured 
in Piers Plowman.  There the rationale of charity was the salvation of a rich 
merchant’s soul (there’s altruism for you!).  Its re-expression as part of the Tudor 
reconstruction of post-medieval society was recognition of the importance of private 
wealth for public purposes; the need for legal security and protection to encourage 
citizens, especially the well-to-do, to take a share in meeting the public needs of 
society and social well being.  It is quite as appropriate to describe the preamble as 
the compact of Elizabeth I as to regard it as an Ur-text for civil society!  And that 
tradition, that perspective runs through the charity tradition.  The regeneration of 
charity in the 19th century, giving England (and Wales but not Scotland!) the Charity 
Commission and Pemsel, reflected the process by which the novel social issues of 
the industrial revolution were met by philanthropy, in partnership with government.  Of 
course there was a sturdy Victorian independence – of initiative and critique from 
government.  But the tradition of charity is as much a partnership with the State as it 
is a counterbalance or conscience.  Unlike the post Napoleonic Civil Law tradition of 
Continental Europe, where the public good is the responsibility of the State, 
apotheosised by Hegel, in common law the public good precedes the role of the 
State.  The preambular tradition is as good a statement of the public interest as one 
can find – and charity is charged with giving effect to it.  Government has two roles: to 
uphold the framework: reforming – for example by establishing the Preamble when 
charity was becoming corrupt, by setting up the Charity Commission when charity law 
and the Chancery Court were stifling it - when necessary; and establishing a 
partnership with it - by determining what part of the public good should be provided 
direct by the government, central and local, what should be provided jointly through 
public funding and charitable delivery, and what can safely (or equitably)  be left to 
charity.  The division has naturally ebbed and flowed over the centuries – ebbed 
particularly as the State took over responsibility during the 20th century for increasing 
parts of social provision into the Welfare State; flowing back since then as the 
importance of ‘active citizens’ contribution has become increasingly important. 
 
3.5 So I argue, the growth of the contract culture, sealed by the compact, under which the 
public and charitable sector enters into partnership is neither new nor contrary to the 
ethos or principles of charity.  That this partnership carries risks, needs to be entered 
into with care and integrity is clear enough and needs constant vigilance and 
restatement, since the power and wealth of the public sector is seductive.  Charities 
must heed Frank Prochaska’s warning against swimming like fish into the mouth of 
Leviathan!  But to suggest that the partnership is unprincipled, conflicts with the 
imperative to hold the State to account, flies in the face of the fact that, at root, the 
purpose of both State and Charity is the public good. 
 
3.6 I am not arguing that criticism of government by charity is somehow wrong, is itself 
unprincipled.  On the contrary, the responsibility of charities to speak up on issues of 
public policy, to challenge government policy where they regard it as deleterious to 
their charitable purpose (which by definition is in the public interest) is fundamental.  
Perhaps the thing that gave me most personal satisfaction at the Charity Commission 
was to be able to underpin that in guidance on political activities and campaigning by 
charities.  But this role flows from the joint commitment to the public interest.  Just as 
charities may fall below the standards implied by their status – the imperfection of the 
human realisation of the ideal – and must be accountable, so the imperfect realisation 
of the idealized State, through human political parties must be open to challenge by 
their charitable partners (often with more experience and genuine knowledge – not to 
say commitment – than the traditional custodians of political scrutiny, the media). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1 So what answer do I give to this initial question of the relationship between charity 
and civil society?  First that civil society is a necessary part of healthy diversity and 
freedom in society, but not, in itself, a guarantee of public well being.  Secondly that 
the distinctive charity traditions putting the determination of public benefit at the heart 
of the sector are of civil society value.  That is, it is not just a (tax determined) 
judgement by the State as to what it favours, but a wider, deeper concept at the heart 
of society, underpinning both State and civil society.  How public benefit is determined 
in the modern world, by whom and what authority – that is the big question, and one 
which after seven years of engagement with it at the Charity Commission, followed by 
a couple of years as a member of the NCVO Working Group and Scottish 
Commission, I regard as the most important issue in the modernisation of charity in 
the 21st century. 
 
